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Abstract 
TikTok is the international twin of China’s mobile short video app, Douyin, and 
one of the fastest growing short video platforms in the world. Owned by Chinese 
tech giant, ByteDance, TikTok and Douyin share many similarities in terms of 
appearance, functionality, and platform affordances; however, they exist in 
radically different markets and are governed by radically different forces. Unlike 
other popular mobile media platforms in China and internationally, TikTok and 
Douyin are neither part of the big three tech giants in China nor the big five in 
the US. This provides an interesting case study to investigate how an emerging 
internet company adapts its products to better fit divergent expectations, cultures, 
and policy frameworks in China and abroad. Using the app walkthrough method 
informed by platformization of culture production theory, this study highlights the 
similarities and distinctions between these two platforms. We argue the co-
evolution of Douyin and TikTok is a new paradigm of global platform expansion 
that differs from strategies of regionalization adopted by previous major social 
media platforms. We contribute to platformization theory by developing the 
concept of parallel platformization to explain ByteDance’s strategies for surviving 
in two opposing platform ecosystems in China and abroad. 
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Introduction  
Around the world, the year 2019 may be remembered as the year adults frantically sought 
to figure out what a “TikTok” was and why millions of teens were so obsessed with it. 
In 2019, TikTok shot to global prominence seemingly overnight and cemented itself 
alongside touchstone digital media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp both through 
its popularity in massive markets like the US and India, but also through its popularity 
in the largest internet market in the world: China (Chen, 2019; Savic & Albury, 2019). 
TikTok is the international version of China’s mobile short video platform, Douyin, 
owned by the Chinese tech giant, ByteDance. Both platforms have seen sustained growth 
from 2019 into 2020, surpassing 2 billion downloads in April 2020 amid an ongoing 
global health crisis (Qu, 2020). Douyin and TikTok are both short video platforms that 
feature 15 to 60 second videos, largely constituted of user-generated content (UGC) as 
opposed to professionally generated content (PGC). This study extends recent inquiries 
into Chinese digital spaces for platformization theory building (de Kloet et al., 2019; Lin 
& de Kloet, 2019; Wang & Lobato, 2019; Zhang, 2020) by exploring and comparing the 
development of two short video platforms, Douyin and TikTok, in China and abroad. 
“Short video” refers to video content that is shorter than 5 minutes distributed via 
digital media platforms. Short video features include low-cost production, highly 
spreadable content, and blurry boundaries between producers and consumers (Kong, 
2018). By October 2018, short video platforms in China reached 648 million users, 
accounting for almost 80% of all internet users in the country (China Internet Network 
Information Centre [CNNIC], 2019). China has developed a “self-sustained social media 
ecosystem” (McLelland et al., 2017, p. 59) due to the restrictions of the “Great Firewall” 
on the internet of mainland China. In this rapidly growing and self-sustained social media 
ecosystem, the emergence of copycat (shanzhai) versions of Western social media in 
mainland China have sparked the development of China’s own unique social media 
applications (Keane & Zhao, 2012). Chinese shanzhai platforms have become improved 
and localized (McLelland et al., 2017), and have developed different trajectories in 
China. What has led social media development along distinctive paths in China is “local 
dynamics, individual agency, and indigenous innovation in domesticating Western 
technologies and concepts” (McLelland et al., 2017, p. 64). The birth and growth of the 
short video industry in China and later in the West is a powerful example of how 
platforms and platform economies may develop differently along two parallel paths. 
China’s burgeoning short video industry includes various platforms dedicated to 
social entertainment, news and information, and video editing (Kong, 2018). Kuaishou, 
Douyin, and Meipai are three major players among those short video platforms tailored 
for social entertainment (Su, 2019). The growth of international short video industries 
has progressed slower than the Chinese short video industry (Su, 2019). For example, 
one early international entrant, Vine, received great interest and was acquired by Twitter 
before its launch in 2012 (Isaac, 2016). While Twitter would go on to shut down Vine in 
2016, the legacy of short video platforms persisted in apps such as Snapchat, Musical.ly, 
and later Facebook and Instagram “story” functions. TikTok’s predecessor, Musical.ly 
was launched by a Chinese tech company that targeted the US market in 2014 (Spangler, 
2016). After its success in the US, Douyin’s parent company ByteDance acquired 
Musical.ly and rebranded it as TikTok in 2018 (Chen, 2019). TikTok shares similar 
digital architecture with Douyin but is marketed to a completely different user base and 
governed by different forces. TikTok’s international user base was established in its 
earlier days as “Musical.ly”, a primarily music lip-synching short video platform. 
Musical.ly reportedly had over 200 million subscribers in the US when it was acquired 
by ByteDance and rebranded it as TikTok (Dave, 2018). The decision to acquire 
Musical.ly was a strategic move by ByteDance that “combined [Douyin’s] AI-fed 
streams and monetization track record with Muscal.ly’s product innovation and grasp of 
users’ needs and tastes in the West” (Fannin, 2019, p.1). 
TikTok and Douyin are exceptional cases to refine conceptual frameworks of 
platformization because they are owned by the same Chinese company but operated as 
two separate platforms in China and the rest of the world. TikTok and Douyin are unique 
considering the dominance of American and Chinese platform ecosystems across the 
globe (van Dijck et al., 2018). Douyin is not owned or aligned with the trio of Chinese 
internet giants, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT) and neither is TikTok associated with 
any of the “big five” internet companies: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and 
Microsoft (GAFAM). Previous studies have called for the decentralization of the US in 
scholarly platform debates (Steinberg & Li, 2017) and to critically evaluate the techno-
orientalism that surrounds Chinese tech companies and platforms (de Kloet et al., 2019). 
Analyzing TikTok and Douyin side-by-side is instructive for future studies to examine 
platformization. TikTok and Douyin are developed by the same tech company but 
deployed in vastly different contexts and have thus far managed to survive as emerging 
platforms in two opposing but comparable oligopolistic platform ecosystems. 
This article begins by looking at the ways the two apps are “platformized” in China 
and abroad (Nieborg & Poell, 2018) followed by our method of data collection using the 
app walkthrough method (Light et al., 2018). We next organize our exploratory analysis 
and findings according to three dimensions of platformization: infrastructures, markets, 
and governance. We conclude by arguing that TikTok and Douyin evidence a strategy 
of parallel platformization that creates opportunities and challenges for ByteDance and 
other tech companies, Chinese or otherwise, looking to expand into new international 
markets. The main theoretical outcome of this study is our conceptualization of parallel 
platformization, which contributes to the growing scholarship theorizing platformization 
and has practical implications for understanding the intense and unfolding international 
political scrutiny facing TikTok and ByteDance. 
Conceptual framework: Platformization 
The term platformization was first introduced by Helmond (2015) to conceptualize the 
rise of digital platforms as the dominant infrastructural and economic model of the social 
web and its consequences. More recent scholarship further develops this concept to 
capture the growing complexity in wider technology ecosystems (Duffy et al., 2019; 
Nieborg & Poell, 2018; van Dijck et al., 2018). Van Dijck and colleagues (2018) define 
platformization as the way in which entire societal sectors are transforming as a result of 
the mutual shaping that occurs between digital platforms and entities using platform 
infrastructures to provide products and services to end users. Focusing on digital video 
games as “contingent cultural commodities,” Nieborg and Poell (2018, p. 4276) 
introduce platformization as a theoretical lens to investigate how economic, 
governmental, and infrastructural extensions of digital platforms are reshaping modes of 
production in the cultural industries. Theories of platformization are continuing to 
develop and call attention to the question of how cultural products and society are 
influenced by the penetration of platform logics or “the norms, strategies, mechanisms, 
and economies” of platforms (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 2). In this study, we define 
platformization as the process by which online applications shape cultural and social 
lives through their infrastructures, business models, and governance. 
The concept platformization has been previously used to research the social 
implications of mainstream Western (Helmond, 2015; van Dijck et al., 2018), as well as 
Chinese (de Kloet et al., 2019; Lin & de Kloet, 2019; Wang & Lobato, 2019) digital 
platforms. We utilize platformization for a comparative analysis of ByteDance’s two 
short video platforms. Chinese platforms have macro-level distinctions in terms of 
market, regulation, and affordances and attend to micro-level assumptions about 
platforms such as recommendation and personalization (Wang & Lobato, 2019). These 
distinctive characteristics call for a “spatialized platform theory that is sensitive to the 
historical origins of particular platforms” to “de-Westernize” platform studies (Wang & 
Lobato, 2019, p. 12). Platformization serves as an effective theoretical lens to analyze 
how the sharp contrasts between the technological and sociopolitical contexts in China 
and the Global “West” has partitioned TikTok and Douyin into two separate short video 
parallel universes. 
Additionally, platformization provides a useful analytical lens through which we can 
systematically interrogate how platform logics and ecosystems affect the operation of 
cultural industries. Nieborg and Poell’s (2018) framework highlights three analytical 
dimensions of platformization: infrastructures, markets, and governance. Beginning with 
infrastructures, platformization theory considers how features and services affect modes 
of digital cultural production and circulation. As Gillespie (2017) reasons: 
Everything on a platform is designed and orchestrated. While social activity would exist 
without Facebook or Twitter the kind of social activities that occur there depend powerfully on 
the space and structure they provide. These structures are certainly not neutral: these are 
designed to invite and shape participation, toward particular ends (p. 258). 
Gillespie (2017) underlines how platforms purposefully design their architecture to 
shape participation and discourse. Although Douyin and TikTok are both developed by 
the same company to provide essentially the same service, the distinctive cultural and 
socioeconomic ecosystem these two platforms operate may drive them to provide 
different platform infrastructure. We therefore ask: 
RQ1: What are the main platform features distinguishing Douyin and TikTok, and 
their social implications? 
Next, platformization considers the impact of dominant market structures in which 
platforms operate. Prior research on platformization underlines the impacts of multisided 
markets (Nieborg, 2015; Nieborg & Poell, 2018) on economic exchanges taking place 
on platforms. Platforms serve, non-exclusively, as data-intermediaries that aggregate, 
facilitate, and control the connection between distinctive actors such as micro-
entrepreneurs, institutions, content developers, advertisers, and end users (van Dijck et 
al., 2018, p. 38). The economic configuration of visual media platforms presents a similar 
form of multisided market. 
Market structures of visual social media sites, such as Instagram, and video content 
platforms, such as YouTube, are interrelated with the “influencer economy” 
(Cunningham & Craig, 2019). Visual media platforms depend on creative content 
uploaded by their users, particularly influencers, to attract traffic and generate revenue. 
User activities, social relations, and transactions are variously commodified, such as 
through targeted advertising. This form of commodification by platforms is described as 
“internet play labour [sic]” where users hardly feel like they are engaging in labor, but 
create economic value (Fuchs & Trottier, 2013, p. 34). Influencers, as well as other 
micro-entrepreneurs, also rely on platforms to amplify their visibility, sell products, and 
receive monetary gifts from viewers directly (Zeng, 2020; Zhang et al., 2019). How 
platforms reward play labor varies from case to case and can significantly shape user 
practices. Because Douyin and TikTok target completely different contexts, the self-
sustained Chinese market and international markets, the business models deployed to 
engage with play labor and generate revenues for creators may vary significantly. Thus, 
we ask: 
RQ2. To what extent do Douyin and TikTok have different business models, and how 
do they impact platforms’ and users’ practices? 
Platform governance is the final dimension of platformization of cultural production 
theory. Platform governance seeks to identify the political economy of how cultural 
production is constructed, negotiated, and regulated through platforms (Nieborg & Poell, 
2018). Governance unpacks both the ways in which platforms are internally governed 
through terms of use (ToU), content moderation, and development guidelines as well as 
the larger governing or regulatory systems that externally influence platforms. Gillespie 
(2017) notes that governance of platforms and governance by platforms are two 
distinctive phases of governance that should be investigated separately. The former 
focuses on policies specifying the liabilities of online platforms; the latter refers to 
interventions conducted by platforms themselves to police content they host, for both 
legal and economic reasons (Gillespie, 2017). 
Facing distinct regulatory environments at home in China and abroad, ByteDance’s 
commercial success relies on responsive policies regulating TikTok and Douyin 
according to disparate systems of governance. Previous scholars argue that platform 
regulations in the West are underpinned by liberal democratic ideologies while those in 
China are underpinned by paternalistic ideologies with command-and-control 
regulations from the Chinese government (Wang & Lobato, 2019). But more complex 
and co-regulatory governance frameworks have also been shown in China’s dealings 
with digital platforms operated by Chinese tech giants such as Tencent and Alibaba 
(Hong & Xu, 2019). Given the malleable nature of social media platforms (Bucher & 
Helmond, 2017), more nuanced complexities are expected to emerge when it comes to 
regulations of and by TikTok and Douyin respectively. Therefore, we ask: 
RQ3. How do Douyin and TikTok differ in terms of platform governance? 
Collectively our three research questions seek to explore the differences and highlight 
the similarities in the platformization of TikTok and Douyin. To answer these questions, 
we systematically analyze Douyin and TikTok using the app walkthrough method and 
trade press analysis. 
Method 
We collected data through three sessions of side-by-side app walkthroughs of Douyin 
and TikTok in August and September 2019. An app walkthrough is “a way of engaging 
directly with an app’s interface to examine its technological mechanisms and embedded 
cultural references to understand how it guides users and shapes their experiences,” 
(Light et al., 2018, p. 882). The app walkthrough method provides an excellent baseline 
for further analysis of understudied Chinese platforms such as TikTok and Douyin 
(Wang & Lobato, 2019). App walkthroughs can also pinpoint unexpected user practices 
or, in this case, the nuanced similarities and differences between two ostensibly identical 
apps. Two researchers collected walkthrough data by interacting with the homepage, 
discovery page, settings page, terms and conditions, and engaging with various features 
of both platforms such as video creation features, social features, cross-platform 
connectivity features and reporting features. Data were also collected from analyzing in-
app settings, privacy policies, and ToU. 
We structured our walkthrough according to platformization of cultural production 
theory (Nieborg & Poell, 2018). First, to understand infrastructural differences and 
similarities, we explored the user interfaces and functions of both apps. Second, to 
explore business model distinctions we focused on in-app currency systems 
supplemented by trade press analysis. Third, to study governance, we examined trade 
press reports on governance of the two platforms and focused on terms of use, privacy 
settings, and reporting functions to understand governance by the two platforms. This 
conception of governance looks at the platforms themselves but also, in a broader sense, 
how ByteDance manages and regulates user activity according to specific operating 
models (Light et al., 2018). The three dimensions of platformization are theorized to be 
enmeshed and interconnected (Nieborg & Poell, 2018). As such, while we organize our 
finding section according to infrastructures, business models (markets) and governance, 
we acknowledge areas overlap throughout the following sections. 
Findings 
Infrastructures 
We first describe the differences and similarities of TikTok and Douyin’s infrastructures, 
or platform features. At face value, the two platforms’ features are very similar. These 
similarities cannot be solely explained by the fact that both platforms belong to the same 
genre of short video platforms. We noted design language (e.g., logo, aesthetics) and 
features (e.g., filming and uploading videos) shared by TikTok and Douyin that clearly 
reinforce the two platforms belong to the same parent company. Our walkthroughs 
revealed that the affordances of both platforms, in terms of user functionality, 
architecture and design (Nagy & Neff, 2015) reflect the same logic. The design of the 
homepage is very similar, the two platforms have the same graphical user interface 
(GUI), and use the same logo displayed in the top left corner of videos, a vibrating red 
and blue musical note. The interface for creating short videos appears by tapping the “+” 
button that is located in the bottom middle of both apps (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The 
default setting of this video creation interface activates the device’s front or rear camera 
with several setting options on the margins, such as “effects”, “timer” and “filters”. 
While the structure of this interface and names of options are identical on Douyin and 
TikTok, we found the default camera filter of Douyin makes users’ skin tones appear 
much lighter than on TikTok. This speaks to a cultural distinction between the intended 
user base. In China, meibai (literally meaning “beautify whitening”) is a widely popular 
camera tool (Li, 2019). Further cultural distinctions became more evident in exploring 
the “effects” settings where both apps display visual effects, filters, and stickers. The 
“effects” are predictably different on both apps as they reference aesthetics, popular 
culture, or internet memes that are only relevant to the respective local audiences. Given 
that cultural proximity is a key factor in mobile video consumption (Lin et al., 2015), 
different cultural references on Douyin and TikTok help the two platforms attract 
audiences. 
We moved on to explore user experiences with infrastructures by assuming “a 
user’s position while applying an analytical eye” (Light et al., 2018, p. 11). Our 
walkthrough of Douyin and TikTok from a user position revealed that core user 
infrastructures are nearly identical. To begin, the short video creation process on 
Douyin and TikTok is highly streamlined as both platforms include detailed and 
standardized templates to help users seamlessly become creators by capitalizing on 
popular trends. Both apps prioritize video creation, as illustrated by the central 
location of the video creation button on the main menu of the platforms (Figure 1 
and Figure 2). There are two categories of maximum short video length on both 
platforms: 15 seconds and 60 seconds. Users on both platforms can upload video 
clips from their device or shoot video footage using their device camera. After 
uploading or shooting video clips, both platforms provide users with tools to edit the 
video, including “sounds”, “effects”, “text”, “stickers”, “volume”, “trim”, and 
“filters”. While Douyin and TikTok share the same standardized processes for 
creating and posting videos, there is clear cultural variance in the video effects 
libraries (Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
The final step in video creation is to prepare the video to post. Users on both platforms 
can write a caption for their video, add hashtags, and @mention other users. They can 
select from a small variety of privacy settings and then can post their videos. In addition, 
both platforms display several other social media platforms on which users can share 
their videos. As we discuss below, the integrated platforms options differ based on 
Chinese and international social media use. The content creation processes on Douyin 
and TikTok are shaped by platform logics. While the seemingly neutral options offer 
users freedom and resources to create videos on the platform, these options actually 
shape content circulated on the platform into a range of certain forms. This streamlined 
content creation process would ensure the consistency of content on Douyin and TikTok 
respectively, in terms of video length, tones, aesthetics, and popular sounds. 
Moving on to content consumption, the “home button” located in the bottom left 
corner of the on screen menu takes users to the main portal for viewing videos on both 
Douyin and TikTok: a full screen with the title of “For You” that automatically begins 
playing videos. Users cycle through videos by swiping up or down, and videos are 
recommended to users based on ByteDance’s proprietary recommendation algorithm. 
Both viewing portals employ endless scrolling features for viewing and discovery. Users 
can scroll through videos for hours without ever getting to “the end” of the content and 
users can refresh the content feed at any time to see new algorithmically curated 
selections. Through this mechanism, every individual user will be shown unique videos 
in the “For You” section based on personalized user data. 
 
 
Figure 1. TikTok Home Screen. 
The second main way to consume video content is the “Discover” interface, which 
shows a list of hashtags that are popular or trending. The Discover feature appears on 
both TikTok and Douyin and functions the same. Douyin also includes a second trending 
tab next to “Discover” entitled “positive energy” (Figure 5). “Positive energy (zheng 
nengliang)” is an ideological buzzword in China that is emblematic of Chinese patriotism 
(Du, 2014). Positive energy is an umbrella term that represents the ideologies, value 
systems, and ethos of the Chinese Communist Party (Yang & Tang, 2018). Trending 
content on the “positive energy” trending page has been found to promote a specific type 
of propaganda, termed playful patriotism, that takes advantage of Douyin’s platform 
features and audiences. Playful patriotism is “state-endorsed, but not necessarily 
orchestrated, light-hearted or amusing media content that promotes an established State 
ideology” (Chen et al., 2020, p. 15). There is no analogous feature to the “positive 




Figure 2. Douyin Home Page. 
 
We noted a distinction in content consumption in terms of the web browser versions 
of Douyin and TikTok. Though our walkthrough primarily focused on the mobile version 
of both platforms, by attempting to access links to videos outside of the mobile platforms 
we found that Douyin has virtually no web browser support while TikTok takes a much 
more browser-friendly approach. There is currently no web browser to view or search 
for videos on Douyin. This strategic use of web browsers speaks to a distinction in 
China’s mobile technological ecology (CNNIC, 2019). By disallowing web support, 
Douyin pushes users to its mobile app. TikTok, by contrast, has a browser platform that 
displays trending videos and users may log in to interact with content and embed TikTok 
videos on a variety of other international platforms. In April 2020, TikTok announced it 
would further expand its web browser features, indicating ongoing developmental 
support from ByteDance. 
A final aspect of platform infrastructures we explored are social features. Both Douyin 
and TikTok include social features, such as sending friend requests, the ability to like or 
comment on videos, a messaging system, and cross-platform connectivity to  
 
 
Figure 3. TikTok Top live streams. 
 
share videos using other apps. Unsurprisingly, the cross-platform connectivity on Douyin 
is mainly designed to work with Chinese social media platforms, such as WeChat and 
Weibo, while TikTok is connected to more international platforms, such as Facebook, 
YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. Videos shared on both platforms can be downloaded 
and shared in exactly the same manner. Users can also socially connect with each other 
through live streaming, but not all users can engage in live streaming. At the time of 
writing, live streaming features are only available to users with over 1000 followers on 
TikTok and 50,000 on Douyin. On Douyin the requirement for hosting live streaming 
also includes real-name verification of users. The mechanism of granting a limited 
number of vetted users access to the live streaming feature is similar to other Chinese 
short video apps, such as Kuaishou (Tan et al., 2020). Constructing live streaming 
services as a reward pushes users to create unique content more often to capitalize on 
fleeting trends. Creators are also incentivized to gain enough followers to live stream as 
streaming is currently the only way to make money directly through the platform on both 
Douyin and TikTok. 
 
Figure 4. Douyin top live streams. 
Markets (business models) 
We next consider the similar business models that are evident on TikTok and Douyin, 
despite the two platforms existing in vastly different markets. On the one hand, in terms 
of the platforms themselves, revenues for TikTok and Douyin are heavily reliant on 
venture capital and advertising (Zhang, 2020). On the other hand, the only way for 
creators to directly earn money through both platforms is via a virtual currency system 
(Figure 6 and Figure 7). Virtual currency exists on both TikTok and Douyin where users 
can purchase coins to send as gifts to other users. Virtual gifting is nascent but also 
ubiquitous on Chinese live streaming platforms (Zhang et al., 2019). At time of writing, 
the only ways to give virtual gifts on both platforms is during live streams. On TikTok 
only users over the age of 18 can use virtual coins, according to the platform’s latest 




Figure 5. Douyin Positive Energy Page. 
 
We found Douyin to have developed more mature business models than TikTok for 
creators. The short video market has had a longer gestation period in China (Su, 2019), 
which is reflected in Douyin’s wider variety of options for direct monetization. In 
addition to virtual gifting, Douyin also includes a “merchandising on behalf” (daihuo) 
feature that embeds icons in live streams that link to products. Live stream audience 
members may click through the icon on the stream to purchase the product, earning 
revenue for the streamer. “Merchandising on behalf” allows live streamers to advertise 
multiple products sold by multiple brands during a single livestream. Merchandising on 
behalf was pioneered by Chinese online shopping platforms such as Taobao and Mogu 
(Yeung, 2019). This model has effectively turned viewers into buyers and now other 
international social media platforms, such as YouTube and Instagram, have integrated 




Figure 6. TikTok Virtual currency page. 
 
TikTok creators, by contrast, rely much more on indirect revenue streams. Live 
streaming is not a pronounced feature of TikTok, with no dedicated section to view live 
streams exclusively. From our walkthrough, we noted users can find live streams by 
following creators who are streaming or by stumbling upon them while scrolling through 
“For You” or trending video pages, whereas Douyin features a dedicated live streaming 
section. This is significant as previous studies (Cunningham, Craig, & Lv, 2019) 
highlight the cultural significance of live streaming in China as compared to international 
markets. Outside of live streaming, rising viral creators can leverage their success into 
influencer marketing agreements with brands (Meinsenzahl, 2019) while other creators 
use their TikTok profiles to funnel followers to other platforms, such as YouTube, with 
more options for monetization. 
Overall, we find similar approaches to in-app monetization, which indicates the two 
platforms are still exploring and developing business models. Douyin has apparently 
benefited from the boom of China’s social e-commerce market. China’s virtual gifting  
 
 
Figure 7. Douyin virtual currency page. 
 
culture (Zhang et al., 2019) and live streaming shopping (Yeung, 2019) have allowed 
Douyin to apply existing successful business models to its platform. However, similar 
strategies are less effective on TikTok, due to the differences in international e-
commerce markets. While content producers have become increasingly subject to the 
political economy of platforms (Nieborg & Poell, 2018), emerging platforms are also 
subject to the political economy of the platform ecosystems in which they are embedded 
(Wang & Lobato, 2019). 
Governance 
Finally, in analyzing platform governance, we consider the distinction between 
governance of platforms and governance by platforms (Gillespie, 2017). Governance of 
Douyin has been shaped by platform regulation forces in China while TikTok’s platform 
governance has been shaped by numerous international regulatory forces. Digital 
platforms in China are required to comply with state imposed regulations (Wang & 
Lobato, 2019). Although the Chinese government controls Chinese corporate platforms 
in indirect ways (van Dijck et al., 2018), the regime determines which political ideologies 
Chinese platforms should prioritize. Douyin’s ToU indicates provisions that explicitly 
reference Chinese political ideologies. For example, one clause states users “must not 
overthrow socialist political system” (Douyin, 2019). Governance of TikTok has varied 
depending on national content. A major regulatory concern has focused on children and 
adolescents using the platform resulting in bans in countries like India (Parkin, 2019) 
and Indonesia (Silviana & Potkin, 2018) and class-action lawsuits in countries like the 
US (Sherman, 2020). More recently governance action has involved concerns over 
privacy and national security, resulting in a second ban in India and threats of bans in the 
US and Australia (Taylor, 2020). 
In responding to regulation and governance issues, ByteDance has employed similar 
platform responses in China and internationally. In 2018, a ByteDance platform called 
Neihanduanzi was ordered to shut down due to vulgarity. In response, ByteDance 
founder Zhang Yiming issued an apology1 and shortly thereafter a new trending section 
called “positive energy” was added to Douyin. The positive energy tab collects and 
displays a series of videos that promote a more playful style of patriotic content. This 
playful patriotism is “more akin to camouflage; ByteDance’s survival tactic rather than 
the true aim of the platform,” (Chen, Kaye, & Zeng, 2020, p. 24). This tactic of 
responding to controversy by using the platform to promote social causes was repeated 
in India and Indonesia, two crucial markets for TikTok (Bellan, 2020; Chen, 2020). In 
Indonesia, TikTok was briefly banned for hosting “negative content” aimed at minors 
under the age of 18 (Silviana & Potkin, 2018). A year later, TikTok was briefly banned 
in India for hosting pornographic material (Parkin, 2019). Both bans lasted less than two 
weeks but caused significant reputational damage to TikTok and ByteDance. In 
response, ByteDance announced coordinated education campaigns in Indonesia such as 
#belajarbareng (study together) (Awaliyah, 2019) and a dedicated environmental 
campaign in India, #cleanIndia (Sharma, 2019). Through these targeted campaigns, 
ByteDance responds to local authorities’ governance of its platforms by encouraging 
TikTok and Douyin users to create content to repair the company’s image. 
Moving on to governance by TikTok and Douyin, a significant area of overlap 
involved content moderation. To moderate content, platforms rely on moderation 
algorithms, human moderators, users, or a combination of the three (Nieborg & Poell, 
2018). TikTok and Douyin both employ massive teams of human moderators as well as 
in-app reporting features for user-led moderation. Finding the reporting function was not 
intuitive on either platform. To access the reporting function, both TikTok and Douyin 
users must select the share icon and navigate to the report icon. The report option gives 
users a choice of several different violations they can indicate. At the time of our 
walkthrough, TikTok users could report content that depicts self-injury, harassment, 
bullying, pornography, violence or harm, spam, copyright infringement, hate speech, 
terrorism, promotion of drugs or weapons, and a category for “other”. Douyin users had 
a wider array of reporting categories including pornography, political sensitivity, 
illegal/crime, spam/selling fake goods, rumor/swindling, insulting, not original content, 
copyright infringement, and other. Douyin’s reporting function also featured a specific 
category for underage content that included inappropriate behavior, content that is not 
suitable for minors, discomfort, self-injury, and luring people to like, share, and follow. 
Data-driven decision-making is critical in developing internal platform governance 
systems (van Dijck et al. 2018). By operating Douyin and TikTok in such divergent 
regulatory environments, ByteDance benefits from massive stores of user data from both 
platform ecosystems to help inform governance decisions. One example is that TikTok 
uses in-app governance to shape its content curation trending. Certain viral videos on 
Douyin will be selected to release on TikTok, and one selection criteria is that the Douyin 
video should be suitable for the local culture where TikTok operates. In doing so, TikTok 
can become more competitive in the international short video platform economy and 
ByteDance can, to some extent, bridge cultural flows between the two short video 
parallel universes. 
Discussion: Parallel platformization 
The features, functions, and everyday uses of TikTok and Douyin are nearly identical. 
The subtle distinctions between the two platforms, such as different visual effects to 
match audience preferences and privacy settings, do not change the fact they are, at face-
value, one and the same. Users can create, view, and share short videos in China with 
Douyin just as they can on TikTok internationally. But unlike the face-value similarities 
between other platforms, like iQiyi and Netflix (Wang & Lobato, 2019), the waters of 
TikTok and Douyin flow from the same source into two highly distinct pools: the tightly 
controlled Chinese market and fiercely competitive international markets. In so doing, 
ByteDance has achieved a feat with these platforms that no previous major tech 
company, Chinese or American, has yet managed. Why was ByteDance able to crack the 
code? 
One explanation is the format itself. Short video has been massively popular in China 
for several years, but slower to gain traction internationally. Facebook and Instagram 
arguably capitalized on short form video by launching “story” features, that enable users 
to create short videos or static slideshows that refresh daily. Snapchat enabled users to 
record short videos but was intended primarily as a video messenger with the added 
feature that videos delete themselves after watching. The principal analog to Douyin in 
the West besides Musical.ly was Vine, which was prematurely shuttered by Twitter in 
2016. The recent boom in popularity of short video platforms internationally is evident 
by the foray of new competitors in recent years. Facebook launched its own short video 
platform Lasso in late 2018 and YouTube recently announced it was moving into the 
short video space with the eponymously named Shorts; even Vine made a comeback in 
2020, rebranded as Byte. 
We propose an alternate explanation for ByteDance’s dual success with TikTok and 
Douyin, which lies in their platform practices, or the strategies, routines, experiences and 
expressions of creativity, that shape cultural production on platforms (Duffy et al., 2019, 
p. 2). Our analysis of TikTok and Douyin revealed unique and similar sets of platform 
practices, which we term parallel platformization. 
Parallel platformization refers to practices of platforms that are developed by the same 
entity, offer nearly the same features, but differ in their infrastructures, governance, and 
market. We distinguish parallel platformization from platform localization or 
regionalization, in which developers adapt existing platforms to new markets (IndiaSA 
Comms Team, 2019; Perez, 2019). Parallel platformization extends Wang and Lobato’s 
(2019) conception of a spatialized platform theory, by illustrating how these two 
platforms fundamentally function the same and share the same parent company but are 
governed vastly differently and exist in different markets. 
The parallel platformization of TikTok and Douyin is significant because it is 
unprecedented. Several formal restrictions have prevented GAFAM platforms from 
gaining traction within China. The same formal restrictions do not necessarily apply to 
Chinese developers looking to expand outside of China, yet still powerful BAT platforms 
have struggled to find footing in Western international markets. As we note above, 
TikTok had a head start in the US market through its acquisition and rebranding of the 
already popular short video platform “Musical.ly”. Even so, ByteDance’s commercial 
success has relied on responsive practices, updates, and policies to adapt its platform to 
distinct markets. The following sections highlight some nuanced complexities that 
emerge in the parallel platformization of TikTok and Douyin. 
Circumscribed creativity 
At the infrastructure level, ByteDance has capitalized on the popularity and success of 
short video platforms in China to develop a platform that is carving out its own niche in 
international short video markets. A key aspect of success relates to how these platforms 
circumscribe creativity. Circumscribed creativity draws from the concept of 
circumscribed agency in media organizations. In media organizations that demand 
creative products, managers grant workers greater agency within the scope of pre-defined 
boundaries (Lotz, 2014). The effect of circumscribed agency can allow media workers 
to feel more freedom working in a normally more rigid organizational structure (Havens, 
2014). In the same vein, circumscribed creativity refers to creative potential being shaped 
or guided by platformization. In this way, TikTok and Douyin empowers ordinary users 
to become creators by offering templates or guides that facilitate easy creation and 
capitalize on popular trends (Literat, 2018). Circumscribed creativity distinguishes 
TikTok and Douyin from other video creation and sharing platforms in the United States 
and China by including features that direct users to replicate popular formats for 
themselves. 
TikTok and Douyin further circumscribe creativity by presenting users with 
suggestions for content creation via trending pages and hashtag search filters. While 
other scholars have observed digital creators display creative autonomy that is 
increasingly platform-agnostic (Mehta & Kaye, 2019), the everyday uses and practices 
of TikTok and Douyin seem to foment the creation of certain types of mimetic content. 
Users can create videos based on the ones they were just watching by tapping to create a 
video that uses the same video filter, audio, or effects. This pushes passive users to 
become active creators with relative ease compared to other content creation platforms. 
In our walkthrough, we engaged in the video creation on both platforms and found that 
the infrastructures made the process extremely simple and straightforward, using just 
five taps of a finger. While content creation TikTok and Douyin is facilitated by 
circumscribed creativity, creators, particularly on TikTok (Hayes, 2020), remain vexed 
as to how they can monetize their videos. 
The gift economy 
Platform practices relating to markets, business models and monetization create friction 
between TikTok and Douyin. As we note, the only way to directly monetize in both 
platforms is through virtual currency and virtual gifting. This virtual economy, in turn, 
is only accessible via live streaming, which is currently gated by follower count on both 
platforms. This causes fewer issues in the Chinese market, as live streaming is well-
established in China, as are conventions of virtual gifting (Cunningham, Craig, & Lv, 
2019). Douyin also makes it easier to find live streams with its dedicated live streaming 
section. 
That does not mean that TikTok is having trouble developing business models or 
monetization strategies. There are several approaches detailed in the trade press to 
monetize TikTok popularity through influencer marketing, links to other monetized 
platforms, and merchandising. Sponsored content and brand partnerships are beginning 
to appear on TikTok but as one trade publication observes, “while the odd sponsored 
video appears occasionally, there isn’t a clear-cut way for creators to monetize their 
content directly” (Wetmore & Spritz, 2019, p. 1). ByteDance may change its approach 
to business models and monetization, though reports indicate the current strategy is 
working in China (Zhang, 2020). Further, ByteDance’s recent valuation, estimated to be 
around $100 billion (USD), indicates the company is not in dire financial straits (Sheng, 
2020). This market-level tension highlights the distinction between the Chinese digital 
content market and international markets, but this tension will likely be more 
surmountable than governance issues ByteDance faces due to the stigma of being “a 
Chinese platform” abroad. 
Identity crisis 
Prior to acquiring and rebranding Musical.ly, ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming stated 
in an interview that he hoped ByteDance’s core products would “be as border-less as 
Google” (Tung & Zhang, 2017, p. 1); a lofty goal, even for one of the most successful 
Chinese tech companies not associated with BAT. However, despite attempts to distance 
itself from the Chinese government, ByteDance is a Chinese tech company and 
international audiences, regulators, and interest groups show little willingness to 
overlook that fact. Douyin clearly bears more marks of Chinese internet regulation than 
TikTok. As noted above, ByteDance has taken steps to appease the Chinese government, 
such as including a positive energy section following a domestic controversy (Chen, 
Kaye, & Zeng, 2020). While officially TikTok does not include infrastructures or 
policies that can be directly related to the internet governance in mainland China, the 
platform has been the subject of intense scrutiny in different national contexts, in part 
due to its Chinese roots. This has thrown ByteDance’s corporate identity into crisis amid 
challenges from different national governments. 
In developing our conception of parallel platformization, we acknowledge the global 
standards in the nearly identical infrastructures of TikTok and Douyin, but call attention 
to the local standards by ByteDance in managing what is essentially the same platform 
operating in and subject to vastly divergent governance. For example, in December 2019, 
ByteDance reached a USD 1 million agreement to settle a class action lawsuit alleging 
TikTok was in violation of the US Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (Kelly, 
2019). That same month, TikTok agreed to change its virtual currency policy in the UK 
responding to a probe by the BBC (Tidy, 2019). In March 2020, ByteDance announced 
it would no longer rely on moderation teams in China to moderate international content 
on TikTok (Fingas, 2020) and in May 2020 ByteDance appointed a new American CEO 
(Barnes & Nicas, 2020). Even so, international media continue to report on several 
potential threats TikTok poses including privacy, cybersecurity (Kharpal, 2020), and 
ideology (Leskin, 2019). Previous studies have observed that “transnational platform 
companies tend to set global, rather than local standards,” (Nieborg and Poell, 2018, p. 
4285). Seemingly in acknowledgement, ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming announced 
in 2019 that the company would focus on creating globalized products with localized 
content (Digital Entertainment DreamWorks, 2019). Even so, the company remains 
besieged by international criticism and threats of bans at the time of writing (Taylor, 
2020). 
Conclusion 
Douyin and TikTok have very similar digital infrastructures but they exist in different 
markets and are supported by different governance mechanisms. We argue ByteDance’s 
domestic and international success with Douyin and TikTok is due to its unique and 
involved approach to platformization in China compared with international markets, 
which we term parallel platformization. In calling attention to the successes, such as 
employing nearly identical infrastructures that circumscribe creativity to increase 
engagement and popularity on both platforms, we also highlight the tensions associated 
with this process. At the market level, ByteDance appears to be clinging to a gift 
economy model of monetization, that relies predominately on live streaming and virtual 
currency exchange, that is more successful in Chinese markets than in international 
markets. At the governance level, ByteDance is struggling to adapt to heightened 
scrutiny in international contexts, as evidenced by its willingness to settle lawsuits and 
make changes to its platform governance policies to appease international critics and 
regulators. Through parallel platformization, ByteDance is positioned to strengthen its 
core products and further adapt them to divergent markets, while simultaneously being 
exposed to novel challenges and criticism. The big five Western tech giants, GAFAM, 
have yet to penetrate the Chinese market and the Chinese prophets of mass innovation, 
BAT, have simultaneously struggled to penetrate markets outside of China. As an 
outsider to both elite groups, ByteDance now has access to users in the largest short video 
markets in the world and millions of users both in China and in an array of international 
markets. 
This study responds to a call for further research to “zoom in on contradictions, 
ambivalences, and connections” in Chinese digital spaces (De Kloet et al., 2019, p. 250). 
Further, we contribute to platformization theory-building by describing the parallel 
platformization of TikTok and Douyin in terms of platform practices (Duffy et al., 2019). 
Continued investigation is necessary to explore and contextualize changes implemented 
on TikTok and Douyin. Future research should explore the parallel platformization of 
other popular platforms, Chinese or otherwise, to strengthen or critique our findings here. 
Future studies should also consider parallel platformization of these two platforms in 
other markets, such as in India where TikTok is currently banned as a result of an 
escalating soft-power conflict between the Indian and Chinese governments as well as in 
markets such as the US and Australia that are threatening to take action against TikTok 
as part of an ongoing “political furore” (Taylor, 2020, p.1). 
The parallel approach taken by ByteDance illustrates the outsider tech company’s 
ability to transcend China’s self-sustained social media ecosystem (McLelland et al., 
2017) and thrive in more complex and unrestrained multi-sided markets (Nieborg & 
Poell, 2018). We highlight areas of struggle, particularly in terms of markets and 
governance, as key areas for future research. Other Chinese tech companies, like short 
video competitor Kuaishou (Xue, 2020), are already vying to emulate ByteDance’s 
successful parallel platformization of creating infrastructures to shape user experience 
and participation (Gillespie, 2017) while attempting to overcome challenges of being a 
Chinese app abroad. We expect there will be more examples of parallel platformization 
in the coming years and invite additional inquiry on whether such platforms will 
reinforce or disrupt notions of a binary platform ecosystem constituted by Chinese and 
American digital platforms. 
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